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Abstract 
The 1990s were the most prosperous decade in U.S. economic history. The paper analy-
ses to which extent this period fits into preceding cyclical experience. This is done by 
classifying the period 1991-12 to 2000-12 with the help of a 4-phase classification 
scheme based on multivariate discriminance analysis. It is shown that in relation to the 
post 1970 experience, the “fabulous decade” saw considerable shifts of influence be-
tween the 19 classifying variables. Most noteworthy are the much reduced influence of 
M2, Net Exports, and Unemployment on the one side and the increase of Real GNP, in-
flation, Government Expenditure and of Unit Labor Cost on the other side. This confirms 
interpretations of the fabulous decade as the result of a forbearing monetary policy made 
possible by a deficit targeting fiscal policy, low inflation and a productivity jump. However, 
the era looses some of its uniqueness when it is seen in the entire post WW II cycle his-
tory.  
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I.  Introduction 
The 1990s were probably the most prosperous decade in the history of the United 
States. Economic growth 1993/2000 was with 4.2 percent more than 0.5 percentage 
points higher than in 1960/1992, despite a smaller increase of labour force (on this and 
the following: Heilemann 2003). Employment expanded only by 1.7 percent vs. 1.9 per-
cent, but inflation increased by merely 2.5 percent compared with 5.0 of the 30 years 
before. Real income per capita experienced a rise of 3.2 percent – 1 percentage point 
more than in the reference period. As a consequence the Federal deficit/GDP ratio 
came down from -1.6 percent to -1.2 percent. The balance is even more favourable if 
the “fabulous decade” (Blinder, Yellen 2001) is compared with the preceding decade 
and, most of all, if the dynamics within the era, the spurt in the second half of the 1990s 
is taken into account.  
In the age of “diminished expectations”, the new prosperity in the 1990s surprised 
not only the general public and politics, but also economists. One reason for this may 
have been the fact that the long duration of the expansion was the result of many 
causes and their interaction, with good luck being not a small factor. More specific, the 
fabulous decade seems to have been the result of at least three, more or less related 
factors1: Firstly: the Clinton presidency had inherited considerable budget deficits that 
in the view of monetary policy required reduction. The new administration, backed by 
the electorate, followed a firm deficit targeted fiscal policy, and was in a sense re-
warded by the Fed with low real interest rates for an unusual long time span, what 
meant a substantial stimulus for the economy. Secondly, deregulation and liberalisation 
of the 1980s and only gradually improving markets, assisted by a credible monetary 
policy and a surge in productivity as a (late) consequence of the high tech revolution 
helped to keep the inflation rate down. Finally, the 1998 currency crises in South Amer-
ica, South East Asia, and Russia required (and got) assistance by U.S. monetary pol-
icy, i. e. low interest rates. The currency crises led to a revaluation of the dollar what 
helped to keep inflation under control. This in return made it easier for monetary policy 
to keep interest rates down. 
Today, students of the era might differ about the relative contribution of each of 
these factors but the list itself is hardly debated. However, in the late 1990s there were 
also other, less event and policy focussed views of the causes of the Clinton expansion 
and their consequences. Pointing at a number of reasons such as the IT-economy and 
its reduction of transaction cost, Weber (1997) and others were quick to declare the 
“end of the business cycle”. Such declarations were not new, they come up in the later 
parts of long upswings and the cycle had been stated “obsolete” in the late 1920s as 
well as in the late 1960s. Weber’s and others’ diagnosis found much opposition, em-
                                               
1  On this and the following see Blinder, Yellen 2001, Frankel, Orszag 2002, Heilemann 
2002, 2003, Krueger, Solow (eds.) 2002, Council of Economic Advisors [CEA] 2005. 
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phasizing that only a few factors, notably its length, distinguished the present expan-
sion from its predecessors (Zarnowitz 1999). 
More in line with the facts than the new prophets of the “end of the business cy-
cle”, most of all because of the 2001 recession along with its overcoming, appear the 
policy conclusions drawn from the fabulous decade celebrating the renaissance of 
macroeconomic policy, in particular of monetary policy (Blinder, Yellen 2001, pp. 83ff.). 
A view that finds much support when the economic record of the Clinton administra-
tions is analysed in terms of the partisan theory of political business cycles (Alesina, 
Roubini, Cohen 1997). In this view, as a Democratic administration it was very success-
ful with respect to the goals of growth, employment, and inflation, however less suc-
cessful than previous Democratic administrations (in the 1960s!); as to Government 
Deficit, the administration’s performance surpassed considerably this reference and 
those of Republic administrations (Heilemann 2003; for more detailed analyses of the 
macroeconomic performance and policy of the Clinton era see e.g., Krueger, Solow 
(eds.) 2002 and Frankel, Orszag (eds.) 2002).  
Despite the necessity to analyse the 1990s from a current perspective, it seems 
equally essential to analyse the era also in a longer one: How different is the longest 
upswing in U.S. history from its predecessors? What were, next to its long duration, 
characteristics of the “fabulous decade”? Where there new elements – the New Econ-
omy? – shaping the cycle or were they already present before? To answer these ques-
tions, this paper analyses post WW II U.S. business cycles within the framework of a 4-
phase classification scheme based on linear multivariate discriminance analysis 
(LMDA). This will allow statements about dominant macroeconomic influences on the 
cycle and its phases at least from a long run perspective. The scheme to be used has 
been developed by Meyer/Weinberg [M/W] in the mid 1970s (M/W 1975a, b) and up-
dated and revised by the present authors (Heilemann/Münch [H/M] 2002). 
These are rather limited interests. The paper will not address questions such as 
reduced volatility on which much of past discussions of the topic centred (see e. g., 
McConnell, Perez-Quiros 2000, Romer 1999) nor that of dating and duration of the U.S. 
cycle (Hamilton 1989, Watson 1994). The reason for these omissions is that the inter-
est in this part of the question is limited to GNP and that it is much linked to forecasting 
interests – did “leads” change? – while here more substantive, “structural” answers are 
sought after.  
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section presents the M/W scheme and 
its results so far. Based on this scheme, section III examines the cyclical record of the 
Clinton era. Section IV summarizes the findings and draws some conclusions as to 
economic policy and further analysis of the U.S. cycle.  
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II.  The reference scheme 
Classification of business cycles has a long tradition (Zarnowitz 1992, pp. 20ff.). The 
motives for this class of analyses are different. The still dominant reason seems to be 
the role of classification identifying indicators for forecasting purposes (Moore 1992). 
As to classification schemes themselves, the broadening of the cognitive base of busi-
ness cycle analysis, the uncovering of “stylised facts” (Mitchell 1951) in the tradition of 
the historical school lost much of its previous interest with the advent of macroeco-
nomic analysis and its causal orientation. For the U.S., the 9(5)- stage schemes of 
Burns/Mitchell (1947) and the 2-phase-scheme of the NBER (Zarnowitz 1992, pp. 
217ff.) were for a long time the only schemes in use. In the early 1980s Eckstein/Sinai 
(1986) came up with a 5-phase cycle scheme that emphasised the role of credit 
crunches. Not long ago, Sichel (1994) presented a 3-phase scheme driven mainly by 
the inventory cycle. But none of these two schemes seems to have been widely used. 
1. The original M/W business cycle scheme 
In the mid 1970s John Meyer and Daniel Weinberg (M/W) (1975a, b, 1976) presented a 
new scheme to classify U.S. business cycles. Starting point was the NBER’s business 
cycle dating, a 2-stage cycle scheme. With the help of 20 variables they split it into a 4-
phase scheme, entailing “Recovery”, “Demand-pull”, “Stagflation”, and “Recession”.2 
The variables and their weights used to separate the stages were selected by LMDA.3 
The resulting scheme (stages and variables) was successfully tested, not only for the 
then existing five U.S. post-WWII cycles, but also for pre-WW II cycles. In various up-
dates and extensions by M/W and the present authors (for the U.S.: Heilemann 1982; 
for Germany: H/M 1999, 2002), the scheme proved to be rather successful, even 
though in the German case the length of the sample period had almost doubled.  
M/W had suggested a 4-phase scheme, defined as follows (M/W 1975a, pp. 
172f.): (1) Recession. A period of some duration in which total aggregate activity actu-
ally declines somewhat from previous peak levels and is reasonably widely diffused 
throughout the economy. (2) Recovery. The early expansion out of a recession and a 
state of economic affairs in which everything is “going well” – unemployment is declin-
ing, prices are relatively stable, productivity is rising, and total output is expanding. (3) 
Demand-Pull-Inflation. The classic inflationary situation, in which “too much money 
chases too few goods”. The forces of recovery are somehow allowed to achieve too 
much force or pull, with production forced up to capacity constraints, prices rising, rates  
                                               
2  It is not difficult to develop a formal model based on the 20 (19) classifying variables of 
the M/W scheme to explain the four cycle stages; for such an exercise with the BEA’ s in-
dex of leading indicators see de Leeuw 1992. 
3  For a detailed description see for example Brosius 1989, for a short outline see Heile-
mann, Münch 2002.  
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Table 1 Classification of US business cycles into a 4-stage scheme 
1948-5 to 2000-12 
 Cycle1 Starting month of … 
  Recovery Demand-Pull Stagflation Recession 
1 1948-5 to 1949-10 (18) … … 1948-5 (7) 1948-12 (11) 
2 1949-11 to 1954-7 (57) 1949-11 (8) 1950-7 (6) 1951-1 (34) 1953-11 (9) 
3 1954-8 to 1958-4 (45) 1954-8 (7) 1955-3 (30) - 1957-9 (8) 
4 1958-5 to 1961-1 (33) 1958-5 (25) - - 1960-6 (8) 
5 1961-2 to 1970-11 (118) 1961-2 (51) 1965-5 (31) 1967-12 (25) 1970-1 (11) 
6 1970-12 to 1975-3 (52) 1970-12 (25) 1973-1 (21) - 1974-10 (6) 
7 1975-4 to 1980-9 (66) 1975-4 (39) 1978-7 (12) - 1979-7 (15) 
8 1980-10 to 1982-12 (27) 1980-10 (6) 1981-4 (6) - 1981-10 (15) 
9 1983-1 to 1991-12 (107) 1983-1 (15) 1984-4 (43) 1987-11 (36) 1990-11 (13) 
10 1991-12 to … [2000-12] 1991-12 (73) … … … 
      
 1948-5 to 2000-12 (632, Ø63) 285 (Ø 32) 149 (Ø 21) 102 (Ø 26) 96 (Ø 10) 
Sources: Meyer/Weinberg (1948-5 to 1973-9), and authors’ computations (1973-10 to 2000-12). – 1) Length of cy-
cle/phase in parentheses. 
 
 
of productivity improvement declining, etc. (4) Stagflation. A situation of stagnation at a 
high level of activity mixed with price inflation. The strains of Demand-Pull-Inflation per-
haps recede and total monetary expansion diminishes. However, prices and wages 
continue to increase; perhaps because of catch-up effects due to sectoral imbalances 
created during the preceding Demand-Pull-Inflation, or because productivity does not 
improve enough to stabilise wage cost. 
M/W had started with the NBER classification for the period February 1947 to 
September 1973. Their new stages, “Demand-Pull” and “Stagflation”, were separated – 
from “Upswing” and “Recession”, respectively – by “common economic sense” aug-
mented by general knowledge of “recent business cycle history” (M/W 1975a, p. 175).4 
Following an a priori classification of the sample period, this period was then classified 
with the help of Bayesian multivariate discriminant functions containing 20 variables. 
Boundary months between cyclical stages were – in an iterative way – re-assigned ac-
cording to the classifications of the LMDA. The resulting dating of the first 6 post-WW II 
cycles and their stages are shown in Table 1. The variables used in the initial discrimi-
nant analysis were those (1) used by the NBER in its cycle chronic, (2) variables sug-
gested by policy analysis and historical considerations, (3) variables that figured promi-
nently in macroeconomic models or (4) that had been singled out as particularly sensi- 
                                               
4 For overviews over the various cycles, see e. g., Glasner (ed.) 1997, Zarnowitz 1992, 
pp. 20ff. 
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Table 2 Average values of classifying variables 
1948-5 to 2000-12 
Variable Stage1 
 
 
Recovery
Demand-
Pull 
Stagflation Recession All 
Real GNP2 a 4,09 4,51 4,39 -0,32 3,46 
 b 3,84 4,51 4,39 -0,32 3,45 
 c 3,96 4,05 3,37 -0,52 3,03 
 d 3,66 4,05 3,37 -0,52 3,15 
  e  3,47 - - - - 
Unemployment rate a 6,49 5,33 4,04 6,56 5,70 
 b 6,10 5,33 4,04 6,56 5,66 
 c 7,28 6,35 5,43 7,60 6,78 
 d 6,27 6,35 5,43 7,60 6,38 
 e     5.21 - - - - 
Index of unit labor cost, private economy2 a 1,09 2,49 4,04 5,42 2,86 
 b 0,70 2,49 4,04 5,42 2,38 
 c 2,97 2,91 2,32 6,75 3,60 
 d 1,35 2,91 2,32 6,75 2,54 
 e  -0,02 - - - - 
Govt. surplus or deficit as per cent of GNP2 a -1,29 -1,34 -0,73 -1,58 -1,25 
 b -1,26 -1,34 -0,73 -1,58 -1,24 
 c -2,94 -2,37 -2,36 -2,83 -2,65 
 d -1,96 -2,37 -2,36 -2,83 -2,21 
 e  -0,77 - - - - 
GNP price deflator2 a 3,56 4,13 3,89 4,58 3,98 
 b 2,96 4,13 3,89 4,58 3,63 
 c 5,98 5,05 3,66 6,86 5,52 
 d 3,73 5,05 3,66 6,86 4,45 
 e  1,94 - - - - 
Prime rate3 a 0,34 1,19 0,88 -1,60 0,33 
 b 0,30 1,19 0,88 -1,60 0,32 
 c 0,38 1,22 0,30 -2,17 0,15 
 d 0,30 1,22 0,30 -2,17 0,17 
 e  0,50 - - - - 
Gross govt. expenditures2 a 4,68 7,16 16,30 6,94 8,07 
 b 3,20 7,16 16,30 6,94 6,82 
 c 7,56 7,63 3,28 10,34 7,51 
 d 3,77 7,63 3,28 10,34 5,49 
 e  0,81 - - - - 
Money supply M22 a 9,03 7,05 5,45 5,31 7,08 
 b 7,16 7,05 5,45 5,31 6,58 
 c 11,48 8,09 5,02 6,95 8,57 
 d  7,36 8,09 5,02 6,95 7,24 
 e 4,43 - - - - 
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Table 2, continued 
Variable Stage1 
 
 
Recovery
Demand-
Pull 
Stagflation Recession All 
Money supply M12 a 4,93 6,35 4,05 3,40 4,88 
 b 4,20 6,35 4,05 3,40 4,56 
 c 7,35 9,00 3,00 5,94 6,99 
 d 4,92 9,00 3,00 5,94 5,80 
 e 1,80 - - - - 
Net exports as per cent of GNP a 0,12 -0,01 0,17 0,41 0,15 
 b -0,30 -0,01 0,17 0,41 -0,05 
 c -0,08 -0,38 -0,50 0,01 -0,22 
 d -0,59 -0,38 -0,50 0,01 -0,45 
 e -1,09 - - - - 
Wholesale price index, industrial2 a 2,70 4,42 3,73 5,43 3,89 
commodities only b 2,29 4,42 3,73 5,43 3,50 
 c 5,44 5,43 4,03 9,71 6,06 
 d 3,30 5,43 4,03 9,71 4,72 
 e 1,77 - - - - 
Compensation per man-hour2 a 4,71 5,42 5,46 3,89 4,91 
 b 4,99 5,42 5,46 3,89 5,00 
 c 4,88 4,84 5,09 4,90 4,90 
 d 5,19 4,84 5,09 4,90 5,06 
 e 5,42 - - - - 
Average yields on corporate bonds (Moody’s)3 a 0,18 0,68 0,34 -0,45 0,24 
 b 0,07 0,68 0,34 -0,45 0,18 
 c 0,07 0,40 -0,25 -0,31 0,06 
 d -0,04 0,40 -0,25 -0,31 0,00 
 e -0,08- - - - - 
Consumer price index2 a 3,23 4,21 4,64 5,59 4,22 
 b 3,04 4,21 4,64 5,59 3,96 
 c 5,69 5,90 4,67 8,79 6,21 
 d 4,02 5,90 4,67 8,79 5,16 
 e 2,67 - - - - 
Consumer price index, food only2 a 2,52 5,15 5,12 3,92 4,04 
 b 2,45 5,15 5,12 3,92 3,74 
 c 5,07 7,82 5,15 6,19 6,19 
 d 3,53 7,82 5,15 6,19 5,03 
 e 2,48 - - - - 
Output per man-hour2 a 3,53 1,99 1,77 0,73 2,23 
 b 3,00 1,99 1,77 0,73 2,22 
 c 3,11 1,39 1,09 -0,14 1,63 
 d 2,57 1,39 1,09 -0,14 1,78 
 e 1,95 - - - - 
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Table 2, continued 
Variable Stage1 
 
 
Recovery
Demand-
Pull 
Stagflation Recession All 
N.Y. Stock Exchange composite price index2 a 1,04 0,24 1,05 0,24 0,66 
 b 1,05 0,24 0,20 1,11 0,73 
 c 0,89 -0,04 0,25 1,85 0,69 
 d 0,98 -0,04 0,25 1,85 0,80 
 e 1,08 - - - - 
Consumer price index, all commodities2 a 3,48 3,91 4,54 6,13 4,30 
except food b 3,18 3,91 4,54 6,13 4,02 
 c 5,92 5,33 4,57 9,36 6,20 
 d 4,11 5,33 4,57 9,36 5,15 
 e 2,67 - - - - 
Wholesale price index2 a 2,36 4,61 3,68 4,20 3,60 
 b 2,02 4,61 3,68 4,20 3,23 
 c 5,04 6,07 4,12 7,85 5,79 
 d 3,02 6,07 4,12 7,85 4,48 
 e 1,60 - - - - 
Authors’ computations. – 1) a: Results for period a: 1948-5 to 1991-11, b: 1948-5 to 2000-12, c: 1970-12 to 1991-11, 
d: 1970-12 to 2000-12, e: 1991-12 to 2000-12. – 2) Per cent changes are against previous year. – 3) Per cent 
changes against previous month. 
 
 
tive cyclical indicators (M/W 1975a, p. 176). However, whilst the NBER business cycle 
dating is based on the levels of variables (see e.g., Zarnowitz 1992, p. 284), classifica-
tion procedures, like the present one, have to be based on more or less stationary data 
to deliver reasonable results.5 Hence, all variables with an underlying trend have to be 
transformed into changes or differences. The average values of the classifying vari-
ables in the 4 stages “more or less confirm prior expectations in different cyclical 
stages” (M/W 1975a, p. 178, see also Table 2, line a). 
Eigenvalues and cumulative proportions of “explained” dispersion led M/W to find 
two canonical discriminant functions as sufficient and allowing them a straightforward 
interpretation of results. The first discriminant function differentiates by Unemployment, 
changes of the interest rate, productivity and various price deflators, thus separating 
recessions and recoveries from the two “inflation” periods. “Specifically, high unem-
ployment rates, good productivity gains, negative changes in corporate bond rates, and 
small to negative price changes will yield a high negative score on this index; opposite 
conditions will register positively” (M/W 1975a, p. 178). The second function apparently 
                                               
5  Data sources are reported in M/W 1975a. 
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adds only a little to this differentiation. Mainly the course of interest rates helps some-
what in separating the “growth” stages (Recovery, Demand-Pull) from the two “no-
growth” periods.  
In the eyes of M/W classification results within and outside the sample were satis-
fying and promising (M/W 1975a, pp. 187ff.). The error rate amounted to 9.4 percent 
within the sample period and to 40 percent outside the sample period 1973-10 to 1974-
12: But also for more conventional analyses, the latter time span presented a rather 
ambivalent episode, oscillating between “slumpflation” and “inflationary recession (M/W 
1975b, p. 12), later to be labelled as “stagflation”.  
2. Updating and modifying the M/W scheme to 2000 
Before updating the 30 years old scheme we tried to reproduce M/W’s results. The de-
tails and results of this and of the following update have been described in detail else-
where (H/M 2002), thus we can be brief on this here. All in all, the modifications made 
were moderate. The most important changes were, first, the conversion of the variables 
employed (listed in Table 2) into change rates against previous year; second, the ex-
tension of the number of discriminant functions to three, although this makes interpreta-
tion of their parameters more difficult; third, Money GDP was released from the list of 
classifying variables.  
The classification procedure for the period 1973 to 2000 followed the iterative ap-
proach chosen by M/W (1975a).6 It started, again, with splitting the NBER 2-phase 
classification of this period into Recovery/Demand-Pull-Inflation and Stagfla-
tion/Recession. For data reasons, extremely short “a priori” Demand-Pull and Stagfla-
tion phases, but also because we were primarily interested in the Clinton era, the 
analysis did not include the 2001 recession and the following recovery.  
The a priori classification of the new sample period was modified according to the 
classification results of LMDA for the various sample periods. Dating and classifications 
of the 4 cycles after 1973 are displayed in Table 1. Even after the modifications they 
still meet the classification dates by the NBER and also those by Hamilton (1989, Si-
chel 1994). As could already be guessed from previous results and from history, since 
1973 Stagflation is identified only in one of the five new cycles.  
The average values for the classifying variables (Table 2, line b) are in line with 
the current understanding of the stylised facts of the U.S. cycle. When compared with 
averages of the M/W-sample (1948-5 to 1973-9), the levels (of rates of change!) of 
some variables are different, but their inter-phase relationships are still very similar to 
those of M/W.  
 
                                               
6  The computations were performed with the Discriminant Analysis routine of SPSS, Ver-
sion 10. 
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Table 3 Estimation results for the standardized canonical discriminant 
functions1 1948-5 to 2000-12 
Variable Coefficients of function1 
F-Value to 
enter 
 1 2 3  
Real GNP2 a -0,08 0,68 0,34   108,0 
 b -0,51 0,50 0,13 123,8 
 c 0,32 0,34 -0,22 70,4 
 d -0,74 -0,04 0,04 92,7 
Unemployment rate a 1,36 -0,12 0,42 88,9 
 b 1,21 0,66 0,38 75,9 
 c 0,20 -0,60 -0,27 34,2 
 d 0,85 0,91 1,84 20,6 
Index of unit labor cost. private economy2 a 0,16 -0,18 0,63 34,6 
 b -0,03 -0,14 0,30 52,5 
 C 0,06 -0,66 -0,49 14,7 
 d 0,20 0,08 0,03 27,9 
Govt. surplus or deficit as per cent of GNP2 a 0,89 -0,05 -0,04 4,7 
 b 0,78 0,20 0,30 4,1 
 c -0,77 -0,57 0,15 3,7 
 d 0,96 0,92 2,10 3,6 
GNP price deflator2 a 0,14 0,56 -0,27 3,6 
 b -0,08 0,41 0,17 15,4 
 c -1,07 1,93 0,76 19,1 
 d -1,14 0,81 -1,10 27,9 
Prime rate3 a 0,03 0,14 -0,10 11,1 
 b -0,02 0,16 -0,10 12,7 
 c -0,14 0,15 0,12 4,8 
 d -0,09 0,22 0,04 6,4 
Gross govt. expenditures2 a -0,31 -0,10 -0,69 20,9 
 b -0,06 -0,22 -0,38 34,8 
 c 0,03 -0,05 -0,08 25,6 
 d 0,10 -0,80 0,10 44,9 
Money supply M22 a 0,52 0,54 -0,49 63,3 
 b -0,17 0,18 0,09 15,2 
 c -0,06 0,58 0,57 139,2 
 d 0,13 -0,06 -0,01 7,1 
Money supply M12 a -0,04 -0,16 1,39 19,4 
 b -0,22 -0,09 0,72 15,3 
 c 1,45 -0,27 -0,84 52,9 
 d 0,03 -0,44 0,82 25,5 
Net exports as per cent of GNP a 0,30 -0,05 0,68 9,0 
 b -0,14 -0,37 0,45 21,2 
 c 2,09 -0,73 0,18 40,8 
 d 0,48 0,28 0,53 8,1 
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Table 3, continued 
Variable  Coefficients of function1 F-Value to enter 
  1 2 3  
Wholesale price index, industrial2 A 0,32 1,29 0,35 6,1 
commodities only B -0,48 0,91 0,57 12,2 
 C 1,28 1,47 -0,93 8,0 
 D -1,38 0,43 1,47 19,1 
Compensation per man-hour2 A 0,32 1,29 0,35 19,4 
 B -0,30 0,0 -0,02 21,1 
 C -0,95 0,09 1,17 9,8 
 D -0,07 0,14 0,01 16,2 
Average yields on corporate bonds (Moody’s)2 A -0,02 0,16 0,06 5,2 
 B -0,07 0,12 0,06 5,5 
 C -0,11 0,04 -0,04 0,9 
 D -0,06 0,10 -0,01 1,0 
Consumer price index2 A 2,23 0,54 2,97 11,3 
 B 0,62 0,90 0,16 20,2 
 C 0,91 -2,24 -3,55 17,3 
 D 0,03 -0,22 0,59 43,4 
Consumer price index. food only2 A -1,25 0,58 -1,29 12,7 
 B -0,88 -0,06 -0,17 20,8 
 C -0,70 1,69 0,00 8,3 
 D -0,87 -1,13 0,37 33,4 
Output per man-hour2 A 0,37 0,01 -0,54 60,8 
 B 0,32 0,18 -0,59 48,1 
 C -0,60 0,57 0,05 59,3 
 D -0,19 0,46 0,31 58,7 
N.Y. Stock Exchange composite price index2 A 0,01 0,02 -0,12 2,6 
 B 0,04 0,02 -0,06 3,3 
 C 0,00 -0,01 0,10 2,8 
 D 0,12 0,14 0,11 3,5 
Consumer price index, all commodities2 A -2,10 -1,44 -3,44 15,6 
except food B -0,16 -1,76 -1,38 26,0 
 C -0,69 0,93 3,49 24,5 
 D 1,03 -0,21 -1,06 47,3 
Wholesale price index2 A 0,27 -1,62 0,81 5,8 
 B 0,94 -0,69 -0,46 11,9 
 C -0,95 -1,96 1,21 4,1 
 D 1,78 0,18 -0,70 16,2 
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Table 3, continued 
Eigenvalues 
Function Eigen- value 
% of 
variance 
cumu- 
lative % 
Canoni-
cal corre-
Lation 
after 
function Wilks' λ χ
2 df Signifi- cance 
 1 2.05 58.2 58.2 0.8 1 0.1 1107.2 57 0.00 
a 2 1.13 32.0 90.2 0.7 2 0.3 537.2 36 0.00 
 3 0.35 9.8 100.0 0.5  0.7 151.3 17 0.00 
 1 1.3 56.0 56.0 0.8 1 0.2 1018.3 57 0.00 
b 2 0.9 36.0 92.0 0.7 2 0.5 492.5 36 0.00 
 3 0.2 8.0 100.0 0.4  0.8 108.0 17 0.00 
 1 3.6 44.6 44.6 0.9 1 0.0 914.9 57 0.00 
c 2 2.8 35.0 79.7 0.9 2 0.1 550.9 36 0.00 
 3 1.6 20.3 100.0 0.8  0.4 231.2 17 0.00 
 1 1.6 48.3 48.3 0.8 1 0.1 747.1 57 0.00 
d 2 1.3 38.1 86.3 0.7 2 0.3 414.3 36 0.00 
 3 0.5 13.7 100.0 0.6  0.7 130.0 17 0.00 
Authors' computations. Eigenvalue: eigenvalues of the discriminant functions in declining order. % of variance: % 
importance of the discriminant functions. cum %: cumulative importance in relative terms. df: degrees of freedom. 
For a detailed description of the statistics see Brosius 1989. – 1) a: Results for period 1948-5 to 1991-11, b: 1948-5 
to 2000-12, c: 1970-12 to 1991-11, d: 1970-12 to 2000-12. – 2) Percent changes against previous year. – 3) Per 
cent changes against previous month. 
 
 
The newly estimated parameters and their influence differ considerably from those 
for the earlier periods (Table 3). This is in particular the case for Unemployment and 
Real GNP. More or less unchanged parameters and weights (F-value to enter) are re-
vealed only for Gross Government Expenditure, M1, Compensation per man-hour, and 
Output per man-hour. But most of them are only of minor importance within the func-
tions. 
The cyclical characters became more evenly distributed; the weight of the majority 
of variables has been reduced. This is in particular the case for the various measures 
of inflation. Only the importance of Real GNP and of Net Exports – indicators of eco-
nomic activity – has strengthened. Although economic interpretation of these results 
must be careful (see also e.g., Weihs, Sondhaus 2000) – the results seem to underline 
that, with the exception of the Unemployment rate, inflation lost much of its discriminat-
ing power. 
The “explained variance” (Table 3) for the first discriminant function – discriminat-
ing between Recovery and Demand-Pull – is reduced to 50 percent (from nearly 70 
percent), corresponding with a doubling of this ratio in the second function from 20 to 
more than 35 percent, which confirms the picture rendered by the F-values.  
The total error rate of classifications increases for the new sample period to nearly 
15 percent, that is somewhat better than what has been recorded here for the two old 
M/W-samples, 19 percent and 25 percent, respectively.  
The lengths of cycles and phases have been rather stable, compared to the old 
sample and to the NBER cycle dating. The average duration of full cycles is still 62 
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months (NBER: 63), that of Recoveries 22 months (M/W: 23), Demand-Pull-Inflation 21 
(22) months, Stagflations 32 (30) months and of Recessions 9 (11) months. 
 
III.  The Clinton expansion 
As laid out before, the cyclical characteristics of the Clinton expansion deserve interest 
for a number of reasons. This paper concentrates on three questions. First, it asks in 
which way the importance of the classifying variables changed between cycles or within 
their 4 phases; second, how well do the new results explain the pre-1991-12 experi-
ence. Based on these results, we shortly examine the cyclical homogeny of the Clinton 
expansion. Size and direction of these changes depend, of course, on the cyclical ex-
perience or the sample they are compared with. The tables report comparisons with a 
longer sample (1948-5/1991-11) and with a shorter one (1970-12/1991-11); most of the 
text refers only to the latter. 
According to the “F-values to enter”, the most important new characteristic of the 
Clinton expansion was the reduction of the previous overwhelming importance of M2 
from rank (1) to rank (15). It was “replaced” by Real GNP, which had held rank (2) be-
fore. This may reflect the fact that in the 1980s the Fed had given up targeting the rate 
of growth of money and had returned to its former policy of controlling interest rates. 
Considerable gains in importance were to register for the various measures of Infla-
tion7, for Government Expenditure ((4) vs. (7)) and for Unit Labor Cost ((7) vs. (11)). 
Sizeable reductions of importance are found also for M1 ((9) vs. (4)), Net Exports ((14) 
vs. (5)), Unemployment ((10) vs. (6)). The importance of the Prime Rate remained 
rather low, but this may be due to the fact that it is the nominal rate. More difficult to 
explain is why the cyclical meaning of Compensation Per Man Hour, the 
GNP/Government Deficit Ratio and the role of Average Yields on Corporate Bonds 
(Moody’s) and of the New York Stock Exchange composite price index did not change. 
But, again, the latter two variables are the two least important classifiers anyway. 
Therefore the results presented here do not confirm the findings of the recent report of 
the CEA (2005, pp. 59f.) of an increased role of the financial markets for the behaviour 
of private investment (“financial accelerator”). Not at least because this would require a 
causal analysis, which is beyond the methodical possibilities and intensions of this pa-
per. However, our results seem to be much in line with the CEA’s findings about “Ex-
pansions past and present” (CEA 2005, pp. 49ff.), in particular as to the role of mone-
tary and fiscal policy.  
                                               
7  It should, however, be borne in mind that the measurement of inflation (and of real GDP) 
underwent considerable changes. Revisions in the official statistics, however, did go back 
only to the beginnings of the 1990s. 
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Despite the fact that the new sample consists only of data a priori classified as 
Recovery, of course, coefficients of all three functions were affected. While those of 
function 1 (separating periods of upswing from those of downswing) may reflect the 
changes signalled by the F-values, the changes in functions 2 and 3 are more difficult 
to understand. Interpretations of changing significance of variables are, however, risky 
not only for the methodical reasons mentioned above but also because of the different 
explanatory power of the three functions in the various samples. 
Table 4 Classification results for different samples 
1970-12 to 2000-12 
 Predicted group membership 
Actual group No. of cases Recovery Demand-
Pull 
Stagflation Recession 
 1970-12 to 1991-11 
Recovery  85 68 14 0 3 
  80.0% 16.5% .0% 3.5% 
Demand-Pull  82 8 68 3 3 
  9.8% 82.9% 3.7% 3.7% 
Stagflation  36 0 0 35 1 
  .0% .0% 97.2% 2.8% 
Recession  49 0 0 0 49 
  .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Total error rate: 12.7%      
  
 1970-12 to 2000-12 
Recovery  194 160 18 8 8 
  82.5% 9.3% 4.1% 4.1% 
Demand-Pull  82 7 67 6 2 
  8.5% 81.7% 7.3% 2.4% 
Stagflation  36 0 0 36 0 
  .0% .0% 100.0% .0% 
Recession  49 2 0 1 46 
  4.1% .0% 2.0% 93.9% 
Total error rate: 14.4%      
Authors’ computations 
 
 
As to the overall perspective, the inclusion of the Clinton expansion improves 
considerably the explanatory power of the first and of the second discriminant functions 
(Table 3). The classification results for the new sample do not reflect this improvement 
since the total error rate increases from 12.7 percent to 14.4 percent (Table 4). In a 
relative perspective, most of these errors occur by classifying the Recovery as De-
mand-Pull Inflation; effects on previous classifications are small and equally distributed 
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upon all phases. The cyclical innovation resulting from the Clinton expansion is much 
more remarkable when seen in the light of the explanatory power outside sample peri-
ods. The longer sample classifies about 25 percent of the period 1991-2 to 2000-12 as 
Demand-Pull, about 68 percent as Stagflation, 4 percent as Recession, and only 3 per-
cent correctly (Recovery). The results for the shorter sample are even more “disap-
pointing” (0/0/73/27 percent) and thus signal even more strongly structural shifts in the 
cycle picture. (Table 5, Appendix, presents a detailed picture of the classification record 
for each period of the Clinton expansion. Noteworthy there is not only the surprisingly 
high correspondence between the two samples including the Clinton era but also the 
considerable discrepancy between the two long samples.) However, the corroborative 
role of this test should, not only for logical reasons, not be overrated: the classificatory 
power of the scheme outside the sample period usually is not very high. This was al-
ready an experience made by M/W (1975a, b) and in a number of systematic “leave 
one cycle out”-tests by H/M (2002).  
But these misclassifications bear also more pleasant lessons. Within the sample 
period, they mirror very well the difficult time span around 1994/95 for the economy and 
for monetary policy, difficulties that the three other samples encounter, too (Table 5, 
Appendix). Monetary policy felt that it had to react on rising inflation and, “as usual” 
would have sent the economy into recession (Blinder, Yellen 2001, pp. 25-33, Heile-
mann 2003). The classifications with the two longer samples illustrate these difficulties 
very well, too (Table 4). 
IV.  Summary and conclusions 
This paper finds that the long expansion of the Clinton era changed major characteris-
tics of post 1970 U.S. business cycles. More modestly expressed, it shows some sub-
stantive attributes that distinguish it from preceding upswings or Recoveries. With the 
help of linear multivariate discriminance analysis (LMDA) using 19 macroeconomic and 
financial variables to define Recovery, Demand-Pull Inflation, Stagflation, and Reces-
sions developed by Meyer/Weinberg in the early 1970s, it is shown that in the Clinton 
expansion M2, Net Exports, and Unemployment lost much of their classificationary 
power, while that of Real GNP, various measures of inflation, Government Expendi-
tures, and Unit Labor Cost increased. This confirms those interpretations of the Clinton 
era that see low inflation, a forbearing monetary policy, a deficit targeted fiscal policy, 
and a productivity jump as its keystones. Surprisingly, the results do not see a changed 
role for other classifying variables such as Compensation per Man Hour, Government 
Deficit/GNP ratio, Bond yields, or the stock market. The results throw some doubt on 
seeing the Clinton era as a continuous Recovery. Around 1995 a very short Recession 
might have happened. All in all, the results seem to reflect an increased role of financial 
variables. However, within the methodical framework of this paper it is difficult to link 
this to “new policy” or to a “new behaviour” of the investment sector and the “financial 
accelerator” (CEA 2005, pp. 59).  
16  
While re-estimations and up-dates of the M/W scheme generally confirmed it, the re-
sults clearly reveal that, first, for the post 1973 period a 3-phase scheme might deliver 
a better description than the 4-phase scheme. This fits to the proposal of a 3-phase 
scheme based on real GDP changes presented by Sichel (1994), but contradicts the 
idea of a multivariate based 5-phase cycle suggested by Eckstein/Sinai (1986); second, 
once again the results for the longer and the shorter samples make clear, that the 
question of changes of cyclical characteristics depends to a large degree on the stan-
dard with which a new experience is compared. In the present case, the Clinton expan-
sion seems to be outstanding in comparison with those of the 1970s and, probably 
even more with those of the 1980s. When compared with the experience of the 1950s 
and 1960s, the innovation is much smaller. – From a methodical perspective, the re-
sults or at least the classification approach in general offers a promising complement to 
the studies of changes of the business cycle mentioned above. Eventhough such a 
structural approach is not new, actually it is the starting point of the Burns/Mitchell ap-
proach, but it has not found much application in the recent past.  
Will the changes of cycle characteristics detected here be of a transitional or of perma-
nent nature? To answer this question, LMDA would require at least another full cycle. 
That is, hélas, the start of another recession. So far, important characteristics of the 
1990s such as the forbearing monetary/interest rate policy, productivity, compensation, 
and low inflation seem to have played similar roles as in the “fabulous decade”, while 
the roles of Government deficit/GDP ratio, the growth of Gross government expendi-
ture, and of Net Exports differed considerably. Certainly, some of these characteristics 
demand considerable correction in the near future. It is clear that this will substantially 
affect the economy. Whether this also means a repeal of the changes of the character-
istics of the U. S. portrayed here is more difficult to foresee. The interpretation of the 
results presented in this paper would suggest that these changes are of transitory na-
ture.  
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Appendix 
Table 5 Classifications for the Clinton Era 1991-11 to 2000-12,  
various samples 
   Classification 
Year Month Phase a: 1948-5 to    1991-11 
b: 1948-5 to 
2000-12 
c: 1970-12 to 
1991-11 
d: 1970-12 to 
2000-12 
1991 Nov. Recession - - - Recovery 
 Dec. Recovery Recession - Recession - 
1992 Jan. Recovery Recession - Recession - 
 Febr. Recovery Dem. Pull - Recession - 
 March Recovery Dem. Pull - Recession - 
 April Recovery Dem. Pull - Recession - 
 May Recovery Dem. Pull - Recession - 
 June Recovery Recession - Recession - 
 July Recovery Recession - Recession - 
 August Recovery Dem. Pull - Recession - 
 Sept. Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 Oct. Recovery Dem. Pull - Recession - 
 Nov. Recovery Dem. Pull - Recession - 
 Dec. Recovery Dem. Pull - Recession - 
1993 Jan. Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 Febr. Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 March Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 April Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 May Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 June Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 July Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 August Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 Sept. Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 Oct. Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 Nov. Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 Dec. Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
1994 Jan. Recovery Dem. Pull - Recession - 
 Febr. Recovery Dem. Pull - Recession - 
 March Recovery Dem. Pull Dem. Pull Recession - 
 April Recovery Dem. Pull - Recession - 
 May Recovery Dem. Pull - Stagflation - 
 June Recovery Dem. Pull - Stagflation - 
 July Recovery Dem. Pull - Stagflation - 
 August Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Sept. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Oct. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation Stagflation 
 Nov. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
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Table 5, continued 
   Classification 
Year Month Phase a: 1948-5 to 1991-11 
b: 1948-5 to 
2000-12 
c: 1970-12 to 
1991-11 
d: 1970-12 to 
2000-12 
 Dec. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation Stagflation 
1995 Jan. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation Stagflation 
 Febr. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation Stagflation 
 March Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation Stagflation 
 April Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 May Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 June Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 July Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 August Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Sept. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Oct. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Nov. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Dec. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
1996 Jan. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Febr. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 March Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 April Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 May Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 June Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 July Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 August Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Sept. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Oct. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Nov. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Dec. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
1997 Jan. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Febr. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 March Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 April Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 May Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 June Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 July Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 August Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Sept. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Oct. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Nov. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Dec. Recovery - - Stagflation - 
1998 Jan. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Febr. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 March Recovery - - Stagflation - 
 April Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
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Table 5, continued  
   Classification 
Year Month Phase a: 1948-5 to 1991-11 
b: 1948-5 to 
2000-12 
c: 1970-12 to 
1991-11 
d: 1970-12 to 
2000-12 
 May Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 June Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 July Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 August Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Sept. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Oct. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Nov. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Dec. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
1999 Jan. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Febr. Recovery - - Stagflation - 
 March Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 April Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 May Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 June Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 July Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 August Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Sept. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Oct. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Nov. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Dec. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
2000 Jan. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Febr. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 March Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 April Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 May Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 June Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 July Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 August Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Sept. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Oct. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Nov. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
 Dec. Recovery Stagflation - Stagflation - 
Authors’ computations. (-): predicted and prior classification are the same. 
 
 
